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A CATHOUC MODERNITY? 
I want to say first how deeply honoured I am to have been 
chosen as t,his year's recipient of the Marianist Award. I am very 
grateful to the University of Dayton, not only for their recognition 
of my work, but also for this chance to raise today with you some 
issues which have been at the centre of my concern for decades. 
They ~ave been reflected in my philosophical work, but not in the 
same form as I raise them this afternoon, because of the nature of 
philosophical discourse (as I see it, anyway), which has to try to 
persuade honest thinkers of any and all metaphysical or theologi-
cal commitments. I am very glad of the chance to open out with 
you some of the questions which sun:pund the notion of a catholic 
modernity. 
I 
My title could have been reversed; I could have called this talk: 
"a modern catholicism?" But such is the force of this adjective 
'modern' in our culture, that one might immediately get the sense 
that the object of iny search was a new, better, higher catholicism, 
meant to replace all those outmoded varieties which clutter up our 
past. But to search for this would be to chase a chimaera, a monster 
that cannot exist in the nature of things. 
Cannot exist because of what 'catholicism' means, at least to 
me. So I'll start saying a word about that. "Go ye and teach all 
nations." How to understand this injunction? The easy way, the 
one in which it has all too often been taken, has been to take the 
global world view, of us who are Christians, and strive to make over 
other nations and cultures to fit it. But this violates one of the basic 
demands of Catholicism. I want to take the original word 'katholou' 
in two related senses, comprising both universality and whole-
ness; one might say: universality through wholeness. 
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Redemption happens through Incarnation, the weaving of 
God's life into human lives. But these human lives are different, 
plural, irreducible to each other. Redemption-Incarnation brings 
reconciliation, a kind of oneness. But this is the oneness of diverse 
beings who come to see that they cannot attain wholeness alone, 
that their complementarity is esse~tial, rather than of beings who 
come to accept that they are ultimately identiCal. Or perhaps we 
might put it: complementarity and identity will both be part of our 
ultimate oneness. Our great historical temptation has been to_ 
forget the complementarity, to go straight for the sameness, 
making as many people as possible into "good c~tholics" - and 
in the process failing of catholicity. 
Failing of catholicity, because failing wholeness: unity bought 
at the price of suppressing something of the diversity in the 
humanity that God created; unity of the part masquerading as the 
whole. Universality without wholeness, and so not true catholicism. 
This unity-across-difference, as against unity-through-identity, 
seems the only one possible for us, not only because of the 
diversity among humans, starting with the difference between 
men and women, and ramifying outward. It's not just that the 
human material, with which God's life is 'to be interwoven, 
imposes this formula, as a kind of second-best solution to 
sameness. Nor is it just because any unity between humans and 
God would have to be one across (immense) difference. But it 
seems that the life of God itself, understood as trinitarian, is already 
a oneness of this kir:td. Human diversity is part of the way in which 
we are made in the image of God. 
So a Catholic principle, if I can put it in this perhaps over-rigid 
way, is: no widening of the faith without an increase in the variety 
of devotions and spiritualities and liturgical forms and responses 
to Incarnation. This is a demand which we in the Catholic Church 
have often failed to respect, but which we have also often tried to 
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live up to- I'm thinking, for instance, of the great Jesuit missions 
in China and India at the beginning of the modern era. 
The advantage of us moderns is that, living in the wake of so 
many varied forms of Christian life, we have this vast field of 
spiritualities already there before us with which to compensate for 
our own narrowness, to remind us of all that we need to 
complement our own partiality,·on our road-to wholeness. Which 
is why I'm chary of the possible resonance of "a modern 
catholicism," with the potential echoes of triumphalism and self-
sufficiency residing in the adjective (added to those which have 
often enough resided in the noun!) 
The point is not to be a "modern catholic," if by this we 
(perhaps semi-consciously and surreptitiously) begin to see our-
selves as the ultimate "compleat catholics," summing up and going 
beyond our less advantaged ancestors1 (a powerful connotation 
which hangs over the word 'modern' in much contemporary use). 
The point rather is, taking our modern civilization for another of 
those great cultural forms which have come and gone in human 
history, to see what it means to be a Christian here, to find our 
authentic voice in the eventual catholic chorus; to try to do for our 
time and place what Mateo Ricci was striving to do four centuries 
ago in China. 
I realize how strange, even outlandish, it seems to take Mateo 
Ricci and the great Jesuit experiment in China as our model here. 
1This is not to say that we cannot claim in certain areas to have gained 
certain insights and settled certain questions which still troubled our 
ancestors. For instance, we are able to see the Inquisition clearly for the 
unevangelical horror that it was. But this doesn't exclude our having lot 
to learn from earlier ages as well, even from people who also made the 
mistake of supporting the Inquisition. 
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It seems impossible to take this kind of stance·towards our time; 
and that for two opposite reasons. First, we are too close to it. This 
is still, in many respects, a Christian civilization; at least, it is a 
society with many churchgoers. How can we start from the 
outsider's standpoint which was inevitably Ricci's? 
But immediately we say this, we are reminded of all those facets 
of modern thought and culture which strive to define Christian 
faith as the other, as what needs to be overcome and set firmly in 
the past, if Enlightenment, Liberalism, humanism is to flourish. 
With this in mind, it's not hard to feel an outsider. But just for this 
reason, the Ricci project can seem totally inappropriate. He faced 
another civilization, one built largely in ignorance of the Judaeo-
Christian revelation; so the question could arise how to adapt this 
latter to these new addressees. But to see modernity under its non-
Christian aspect is generally to see it as anti-Christian, as deliber-
ately excluding the Christian kerygma. And how.can you adapt 
your message to its negation? 
So the Ricci project in relation to our own time looks strange 
for two seemingly incompatible reasons. On one hand, we feel 
already at home here, in this civilization which has issued from 
Christendom, so what do we need to strive further to understand? 
On the other hand, whatever is foreign to Christianity seems to 
involve a rejection of it, so how can we envisage accommodating? 
Put in other terms, the Ricci project involves the difficult task of 
making new discriminations: what in the culture represents a valid 
human difference, and what is incompatible with Christian faith? 
The celebrated debate about the Chinese rites turned on this issue. 
But it seems that for modernity, things are already neatly sorted 
out: whatever is in continuity with our past is legitimate Christian 
culture, and the novel, secularist twist to things is simply incom-
patible. No further enquity seems necessary. 
Now I think that this double reaction, which we are easily 
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tempted to go along with, is quite wrong. The view I'd like to 
defen'd, if I can put it in a nutshell, is that in modern, secularist 
culture there are mingled together both authentic developments of 
the Gospel, of an Incarnational mode of life, and also a closing off 
to God which negates the Gospel. The notion is that modern 
culture, in breaking with the structures and beliefs of Christendom, 
also carried certain facets of Christian life further than they ever 
were taken, or could have been taken within Christendom. In 
relation to the earlier forms of Christian culture, we have to face 
the humbling realization that the breakout was a necessary 
condition of the development. 
For instance, modern Liberal political culture is characterized 
by an affirmation of universal human rights - to life, freedom, 
citizenship, self-realization- which are seen as radically uncon-
ditional·. That is, they are not dependent on such things as gender, 
cultural belonging, civilizational.development, or religious alle-
giance, which always limited them in the past. As long as we were 
living within the terms of "Christendom," that is, of a civilization 
where the structures, institutions and culture were all supposed to 
reflect the Christian nature of the society (even in the non-
denominational form in which this was understood in the early 
USA), we could never have attained this radical unconditionality. 
It is difficult for a "Christian" society, in this sense, to accept full 
equality of rights for atheists, or people of a quite alien religion, 
or those who violate what seems to be the· Christian moral code 
(e.g., homosexuals). 
This is not because having Christian faith as such makes you 
narrow or intolerant, as many militant unbelievers say. We have 
our share of bigots and zealots, to be sure, but we are far from 
alone in this. The record of certain forms of militant atheism in this 
century is far from reassuring. No, the impossibility I was arguing 
for doesn't lie in Christian faith itself, but in the project of 
Christendom: the attempt to marry the faith with a form of culture 
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and a mode of society. There is something noble in the attempt; 
indeed, it is inspired by the very logic of Incarnation I mentioned 
above, whereby it strives to be interwoven more and more in 
human life. But as a project to be realized in history, it is ultimately 
doomed to frustration, even threatens to turn into its opposite. 
That's because human society in history inevitably involves 
coercion (as political society, at least, but also in other ways); it 
involves the pressure of conformity; it involves inescapably some 
confiscation of the highest ideals for narrow interests; and a host 
of other imperfections. There can never be a total fusion of the faith 
and any particular society; and the attempt to achieve it is 
dangerous for the faith. Something of this kind has been recog-
nized from the beginning of Christianity in the distinction between 
Church and State. The various constructions of Christendom since 
then could be seen unkindly as attempts post-Constantine to bring 
Christianity closer to the other, prevalent forms of religion, where . 
the sacred was bound up with and supported the political order. 
A lot more can be said for the project of Christendom than this 
unfavorable judgement allows. But nevertheless, this project at its 
best sails very close to the wind, and is in constant danger of 
turning into a parodic denial of itself. 
Thus to say that the fulness of rights culture couldn't have come· 
about under Christendom is not to point to a special weakness of 
Christian faith. Indeed, the attempt to put some secular philosophy 
in the place of the faith-J acobinism, Marxism- has scarcely led 
to better results (and in some cases, spectacularly worse). This 
culture has flourished where the casing of Christendom has been 
broken open, and where no other single. philosophy has taken its 
place, but the public sphere has remained the locus of competing 
ultimate visions. 
I also make no assumption that modern rights culture is 
perfectly all right as it is. On the contrary, it has lots of problems. 
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I· hope to come to some of these later. But for all its drawbacks, 
it has produced something quite remarkable: the attempt to call 
political power to booK against a yardstick of fundamental human 
requirements, universally applied. As the present Pope has amply 
testified, it· is impossible for the Christian conscience not to be 
moved by this. 
This example illustrates the thesis I'm trying to argue here. 
Somewhere along the line of the last centuries the Christian faith 
was attacked from within Christendom and dethroned. In some 
cases, gradually dethroned, without being frontally attacked 
(largely in Protestant countries); but this displacement also often 
meant sidelining, rendering the faith irrelevant to great segments 
of modern life. In other cases, the confrontation was bitter, even 
violent; the dethroning followed long and vigorous attack (e.g., in 
France, in Spain, that is, largely in Catholic countries). In neither 
case is the development particularly comforting for Christian faith. 
And yet, we have to agree that it was this process which made 
possible what we now recognize as a great advance in the practical 
penetration of the Gospel in human life. 
Where does this leave us? Well, it's a humbling experience. But 
also a liberating one. The humbling side: we are reminded by our 
more aggressive securlarist colleagues: "it's lucky that the show is 
no longer being run by you. card-carrying Christians, or we'd be 
back with the Inquisition:" The liberating side comes when we 
recognize the truth in this (however exaggerated the formulation), 
and draw the appropriate conclusions. This kind of freedom, so 
much the fruit of the Gospel, we only have when nobody (that is, 
no particular outlook) is running the show. So a vote of thanks to 
Voltaire and others for (not necessarily wittingly) showing us this, 
and allowing us to live the Gospel in a purer way, free of that 
continual and often bloody forcing of conscience which was the 
sin and blight of all those "Christian" centuries. The Gospel was 
always meant to stand out, unencumbered by arms. We have now 
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been able ~to returh a little 'closer to this ideal -with a little help 
from our enemies. 
Does acknowledging our debt mean that we have to fall silent? 
Not at all. This freedom, which is prized by so many different 
people for different reasons, also has its Christian meaning. It is, 
for instance, the freedom to come to God on one's own; or 
otherwise put, moved only by the Holy Spirit, whose barely 
audible voice will often be heard better when the loudspeakers of 
armed authority are silent. 
That is true, but it may well be that Christians will feel reticent 
about about articulating this meaning; lest they be· seen as trying 
to take over again, by giving the (authoritative) meaning. But here 
they may be doing a disservice to this freedom. And this for a 
reason which they are far froin being alone in seeing, but which 
they are often' more likely to discern than their secularist compa-
triots. 
The very fact that freedom has been well-served·by a situation 
in which no view is in charge, that it has therefore gained from the 
relatively weakening of Christianity, and from the absence of any 
other strong, transcendental outlook, can. seem to accredit the 
view that human life is better off without transcendental vision 
altogether. The development of modern freedom is then identified 
with the rise of an exclusive humanism, that is, one based 
exclusively on a notion of human flourishing, which recognizes no 
valid aim beyond this. The strong sense which continually arises 
that there is something more,·that human life aims beyond itself, 
is stamped as an illusion; and judged to be a dangerous illusion, 
since the peaceful coexistence of people in freedom has already 
been identified as the fruit of waning transcendental visions. 
To a Christian, this outlook seems 'stifling. Do we really have 
to pay this price to enjoy modern freedom? A kind of spiritual 
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lobotomy? Well, no-one can deny that religion generates danger-
ous passions. But-that is far from being the whole story. Exclusive 
humanism also carries great dangers, which remain very under-
explored in modern thought. 
' 
n 
I want to look at two of these here. In doing so, I will be 
offeri~g my own interpretation of modern life and sensibilities. 
All this is very much open to contestation. But we urgently need 
new perspectives in this domain, as it were, Ricci-readings of 
modernity. 
The first danger that threatens at:l exclusive humanism, which 
wipes out the transcendent beyond life, is that it provoke as 
reaction an immanent negation of life. Let me try to expla~n this 
a little better. 
I have been speaking of the transcendent as being "beyond 
life." In doing this, I am trying to get at something which is not only 
essential in Christianity, but in a number of other faiths, for 
instance, in Buddhism. A fundamental idea enters these faiths in 
very different form, but which one might try to grasp in the claim 
that life isn't the whole story. 
There is one way to take this expression, which is as meaning 
something like: life goes on after death, there is a continuation, our 
life doesn't totally end in our deaths. I don't mean to deny what 
is affirmed on this readi"ng, but I want to take the expression here 
in a somewhat different (though undoubtedly related) sense. 
What I mean is something more like: the point of things isn't 
exhausted by life, the fulness of life, even the goodness of life. This 
is not meant to be just a repudiation of egoism, the idea that the 
fulness of my life (and perhaps those of people I love) should be 
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my concern. Let us agree with John Stuart Mill that a full life must 
involve striving for the benefit of human kind. Then acknowledg-
ing the transcendent means seeing a point beyond that. 
One form of this is the insight that we can find in suffering and 
death not merely negation, the undoing:of fulness and life, but also 
a place to affirm something which matters beyond life, on which 
life itself originally draws. The last clause seems to bring us back 
into the focus on life. It may be readily understandable even within 
the purview of an exclusive humanism how one could accept 
suffering and death in order to give life to others. On a certain view, 
that too, has been part of the fulness of life. Acknowledging the 
transcendent involves something more. What matters beyond life 
doesn't matter just because it sustains life; otherwise it wouldn't be 
"beyond life" in the meani"ng of the act. (For Christians, God wills 
human flourishing, but "thy will be done" doesn't reduce to "let 
human beings flourish.") 
This is the way of putting it which goes most against the grain 
of contemporary Western civilization. There are other ways of 
framing it. One which goes back to the very beginning of 
Christianity is a redefinition of the term "life" to incorporate what 
I'm calling "beyond life": for instance, the NT evocations of 
"eternal life," and John 10.10. 
Or we could put it in a third way: acknowledging the 
transcendent means being called to a change of identity. Bud-
dhism gives us an obvious reason to talk this way. The change here 
is quite radical, from self to "no-self' (anatta). But Christian faith 
can be seen in the same terms: as calling for a radical decentring 
of the self, in relation with God. ("Thy will be done.") In the 
language of Abbe Henri Bremond in his magnificent study of 
French 17th Century spiritualities, 2 we can speak of "theocentrism." 
1 
This way of putting it brings ?ut a similar point to my first way, 
2Henri Bremond, Histoire litteraire du sentiment religieux en France 
depuis la fin des guerres de religion jusqu 'a nos jours, Paris: A. Colin, 
1967-68. 
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since most conceptions of a flourishing life assume a stable 
identity, the self for whom flourishing can be defined. 
So acknowledging the transcendent means aiming beyond life, 
or opening yourself to a change in identity. But if you. do this, 
where do you stand to human flourishing? There is much division, 
confusion, uncertainty about this. Historic religions have in fact 
combined concern for flourishing and transcendence in their 
normal practice. It has even been the rule that the supreme 
achievements of those who went beyond life have served to 
nourish the fulness of life of those who remain on this side of the 
b.arrier. Thus prayers at the tombs of martyrs brought long life, 
health and a whole host of good things for the Christian faithful; 
and something of the same is true for the tombs of certain saints 
in Muslim lands; while in Theravada Buddhism,, for example, the 
dedication of monks is turned, through blessings, amulets, etc., to 
all the ordinary purposes of flourishing among the laity. 
·· Over against this, there have recurrently been "reformers" in all 
religions who have considered this symbiotic, complementary 
relation between renunciation and flourishing to be a travesty. 
They insist on returning religion to its "purity," and posit the goals 
of renunciation on their own, as goals for everyone, and disintricated 
from the pursuit of flourishing. Some are even moved to denigrate 
the latter pursuit altogether, to declare it unimportant, or an 
obstacle to sanctity. 
But this extreme stance runs athwart a very central thrust in 
some religions. Christianity and Buddhism will be my examples 
here. Re11ouncing, aiming beyond life, not only takes you away, 
but also brings you back to flourishing. In Christian terms, if 
renunciation decentres you in relation with God, God's will is that 
humans flourish, and so you are taken back to an affirmation of 
this flourishing, which is biblically called agape. In Buddhist terms, 
Enlightenment doesn't just turn you from the world, but also opens 
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the flood-gates of metta (loving kindness) and karuna (compas~ 
sian). There is the Theravada concept of the Paccekabuddha, 
concerned only for his own salvation, but he is ranked below the 
highest Buddha, who acts for the liberation of all beings. 
Thus outside of the stance whic~ ~c~epts t~e coqtplementary 
symbiosis of renunciation and flourishing, and beyond the stance 
of purity, there is a third one, which I could call the stance of 
agapcYkaruna. 
Enough has been said to bring out the conflict between modert?-
culture and the transcendent. In fact, a powerful constitutive strand 
. ' 
of modern western spirituality is involved in an affirmation of life. 
It is perhaps evident in tht; contemporary concern to preserve life, 
to bring prosperity, to reduce suffering, world-wide, which is I 
believe without precedent in history. 
f 
This arises historically out of wh~it I have called elsewhere3 "the 
affirmation of ordinary life." What I was trying to gesture at with 
this term is the cultural revolution of the early modern period, 
which dethroned the supposedly higher activities of contempla-
tion and the citizen life, and put the centre of gravity of goodness 
in ordinary living, production and the family. It belongs to this 
spiritual outlook that our first concern ought to be to increase life, 
relieve suffering, foster prosperity. Corkern above all for the "good 
life" smacked of pride! of self-absorption. And beyond' that, it was 
inherently inegalitarian, since the alleged "higher" activities could 
only be carried out by an elite minority, whereas leading rightly 
one's ordinary life was open to everyone. This is a moral temper 
to which it seems obvious that our major concern must be our 
dealings with others, injustice and benevolence; and these deal-
ings must be on a level of equality. 
3See Sources of the Self, Harvard University Press, 1989, chapter 13! 
18 
This affirmation, which constitutes a major component of our 
modern ethical outlook, ~as originally inspired by a mode. of 
Christian piety. It exalted practical agape, and was polemically 
directed against the pride, elitism, one might say, self-absorption 
of those who believed in "higher" activities or spiritualities. 
Consider the Reformers attack on the supposedly "higher" 
vocations of the monastic life. These were meant to mark out elite 
, . - ~ ~ ~ 
paths of superior dedication, but were in fact deviations into pride 
, l i ., 
and self-delusion. The really holy life for the Christian was within 
~ f • ~ >, R I •1 ..J. .. ,l t 
ordinary life itself, living in work and household in a Christian and 
- ~ . . ... 
worshipful manner. 
. . . ... ) l· f 
· There was an earthly, one might say, earthy critique of the 
allegedly "higher" here which was then transposed, and used as 
a secular critique of Christianity, and indeed, religion·in general. 
Something of the same rhetorical stanc~ adopted by Reformers 
> • k I 
against monks and nuhs is taken up by secularists and unbelievers 
aga'inst Christian faith itself: This allegedly scorns the real, sensual, 
eaithly human good for some purely imiginacy higher end, the 
pursuit ofwhich1~an only lead to the frustration of the real, earthly' 
good, to suffering, mortification, repression, etc. The motivations 
of those who espouse this "higher'' path are thus, indeed, suspect. 
Pride, elitism, the desire to dominate play a part in this story too, 
along with fear and timidity (also present in the earlier Reformers' 
story, but less prominent) . 
.. . 
In'" this ·critique, of course; religion 'is identified with the 
second,' purist stance above; or else with a combination of this and 
the first '~symbiotic" (usually labelled "superstitious") stance. The· 
t}:lird, ·the stance of agape/karuna, becomes· invisible. That is 
because a transformed variant of it has in fact been assumed by the 
secularist citic. 
Now one musn't exaggerate. This outlook on religion is far 
from being universal in our society. One might think that· this is 
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particularly true in the US, witli the high rates ·here of religious 
belief ahd practice. And yet, I want to claim that this whole way 
of understanding things has penetrated far deeper and wider than 
simply card-carrying: village-atheist style ·secularists, that it also 
shapes the outlook of many peop~ who see themselves 
as believers. 
~ *"' .. 
What do I mean by "this way of.understanding?" Well, it is'a 
climate . of thought/ a horizon .of assu1nptions, more than a 
doctrine. That means that there will be some oistort'i~n in the1 
attempt to lay it out in a set of propositions. But I'm going t~ do 
that anyway, because there is no other way of characterizing it that 
I know. 
L 
If it w~re .spelled out in propositions, it would read something 
like this: (a) that for us life, flourishing, driving back the frontiers 
of death and ~~ffering 'are of supreme value; (b) that this w~~_n't 
always so; it wasn't so for our ancestors, and for people in other. 
' -
earlier civilizations; (c) that one of things whi~.;h s.t<:>pped it being 
so in the past was precisely a sense, inculcated by religion, that 
there were "higher" goals; (d) that we have arrived at (a) by a 
critique and overcoming of (this kind of) religion. 
I. . . . 
We live in something analogous to a post-revolutionary eli-
• 
mate. Revolutions generate the sense tha~ they have won a great 
victory, and identify the adversary in the previous regime. A post-
revolutionary climate is one which. is extremely .sensitive to 
anything which smacks of the ancien regime, and sees backsliding 
even in '"relatively innocent concessions to generalized human 
preferences. Thus Puritans who saw the return of Popery in any 
rituals, or Bolsheviks· who compulsively addressed people as 
"Comrade," proscribing the ordinary appellation "Mister." 
I would argue that a milder, but very pervasive version of this 
kind of climate is widespread in our culture. To speak of aiming 
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beyond life is to appear to undermine the supreme concern with 
life of our humanitarian, "civilized" world. It is to try to reverse the 
revolution, and bring back the bad old order of priorities, in which 
life and happiness could be sacrificed on the altars of renunciation. 
Hence even believers are often induced to redefine their faith in 
such a 'way as nofto challenge the primacy o_f life. 
My claim is that this climate, often unaccompanied by any 
formulated /~wareness of the underlying reasons, pervades our 
C';Ilture. It emerges, for instance, in the wi~espread inability to give 
any human meaning to suffering and death, other than as dangers 
and enemies to be avoided or combatted. This inability is not just 
the failing of certain individuals; it is entrenched in many of our 
institutions and practices, for instance the practice of medicine, 
which has great trouble understanding its o~n limits, or c~nceiv­
ing some natural term to human.life.4 
What gets lost, as always, in this post-revolutionary climate is 
the crucial nuance. Challenging the primacy can mean two things. 
It can mean trying to displace the saving of life and the avoidance 
of suffering 'from their rank as central concerns of policy. Or it can 
' . also mean making the claim, or at least opening the way for the 
insight, tli.at more than life matters: These tWo are evidently not the 
same. It is,not even true, as people might plausibly believe, that 
they are causally 'linked, in the sense that making the second 
challenge "'softens us up," and rriakes the first challenge ea~ier. 
Indeed, I want to claim (and did•in the ·concluding c,hapter of 
Sources) that the reverse is the case: that clinging to the primacy 
of life in the second (let's call this the "metaphysical") sense is 
m'kK:ing it harder for us to affirm it wholeheartedly in the first (or 
• - • . (4 " • .. , 
practical sense). · 
4Cf. Daniel Callahan, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging 
Society, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995. 
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But I don't want to pursue this claim right now. I return to it 
below. The tliesis I'rri presenting here is that"it is in vlrtue of its 
"post-revolutionary climate" that western modernity is very inhos:: 
pitable to the transcendent. This, of course, runs contrary to the 
mainline Enlightenment story, accordi!.:g to whiCh religion has 
become less credible thanks to the advance ofscience. There is, 
of course, something in this, but it isn't in my ~riew the main story. 
More, to the extent that it is true, that is, that people interpret 
science' and religion as ·at loggerheads,. it is often because of ari 
already felt incompatibility at the moral level. It is this deeper level 
that I have been trying to e:cplore here. 1 t. 
In other wo"rds: to oversimplif{again, the obstaclJs to belief in 
Western modernity are prima.riiy moral and spiritual, rather than 
epistemic. I am·falking~about the driving force here, rather than 
what is said in justification of unbelief in arguments: 
m 
..> • 
But I ar11 in danger of wandering from the mail? line of my 
argument. I have be~n painting a portrait of ~ur age in order to be 
able to suggest that.exclusive humanism has provoked, as i~ were, 
a revolt from within. But before I do this, let us pause.to notice how 
in the secularist affir~ation of ordiri'ary life, just as with the positing 
of universal and unconditional rights, an undeniable p~olongation 
. . ~ . 
of the Gospel has been perplexingly linked with a denial of 
J ' I 
transcendence. 
.J .,; • ~ 
We live in an extraordinary moral culture, measured against the 
' • ' • -1 ; ~ ~ 
norm of human history, in which suffering and ,death, through 
famine, flood, earthquake, pestilence or war, can awaken world-
wide movements of sympathy and practical solidarity. Granted, of 
course, that this is made possible by modern media and modes of 
transportation, not to speak o(surpluses. These shouldn't blind us 
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to the importance of the cultural-moral change. The same media 
and means of transport don't awaken the same response every-
where; it is disproportionately strong in ex-Latin Christendom. 
Let us grant also the distortions produced by media hype and 
the media-gazer's short attention span, the way dramatic pictures 
produce the strongest response, often relegating even more needy 
cases to a zone of neglect from which only the cameras of CNN can 
rescue them. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is remarkable, and 
for the Christian conscience inspiring. The age of Hiroshima and 
Auschwitz has also produced Amnesty International and Medecins 
sarls Frontieres. 
The Christian roots of all this run deep. First, there is the 
extraordinary missionary effort of the Counter-reformation Church, 
taken up later by the Protestant denominations. Then there were 
the mass-mobilization campaigns of the early nineteenth Cen-
tury-the anti-slavery movement in England, largely inspired and 
led by Evangelicals; the parallel abolitionist movement in this 
country, also largely Christian inspired. Then this habit of mobi-
lizing for the redress of injustice and the relief of suffering world-
wide becomes part of our political culture. Somewhere along the 
road, this culture ceases to be simply Christian-inspired -
although·'people of deep Christian faith continue to be important 
in today's movements. Moreover, it needed this breach with the 
culture of Christendom, as I 'argued above in connection with 
human rights, for the impulse of solidarity to transcend the frontier 
of Christendom itself. 
So we see a phenomenon, of which the Christian conscience 
cannot but say "flesh of my flesh, and bone of my bone;" and which 
is paradoxically often seen by some of its most dedicated carriers 
as conditional on a denial of the transcendent. We return again to 
the point our argument was at some time ago, in which the 
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Christian conscience experiences a mixture of humility and 
unease. The humility in realizing that the break with Christendom 
was necessary for this great extension of Gospel-inspired action; 
the unease in the sense that the denial of transcendence places this 
action under threat. 
Which bring us back to the main line of the argument. One such 
threat is what I am calling the immanent revolt. Of course this is 
not something that can be demonstrated beyond doubt to those 
who don't see it. And yet, from another perspective, it is just 
terribly obvious. I am going to offer a perspectival reading; and in 
the end we have to ask ourselves which perspective makes the 
most sense of human life. 
Exclusive humanism closes the transcendent window, as 
though there were nothing beyond. More, as though it weren't a 
crying need of the human heart to open that window, and first 
gaze, then go beyond. As though feeling this need were the result 
of a mistake, an erroneous world-view, bad conditioning, or 
worse, some pathology. Two radically different. perspectives on 
the human condition. Who is right? 
Well, who can make more sense of the life all of us are living? 
If we are right, then human beings have an ineradicable bent to 
respond to something beyond life. Denying this stifles. But then, 
even for those who accept the metaphysical primacy of life, this 
outlook will itself seem imprisoning. 
Now there is a feature of modern culture which fits this 
perspective. This is the revolt from within unbelief, as it were, 
against the primacy of life. Not now in the name of something 
beyond, but really more just from a sense of being confined, 
diminished by the acknowledgment of this primacy. This has been 
an important stream in our culture, something woven into the 
inspiration of poets, and writers; for example, Baudelaire (but was 
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he entirely an unbeliever?) and Mallarme. But the most influential 
proponent of this_kind of view is undoubtedly Nietzsche. And it 
is significant that the most important anti-humanist thinkers of our 
time:· e.g., Foucault, Derrida, behind them, Bataille, all draw 
heavily on Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche, of course, rebelled against the idea' that our highest 
goal is to preserve and increase life, fo prevent suffering. He rejects 
this both metaphysically and practically. He rejects the egalitarian-
ism underlying this whole affirmation of ordinary life. But his 
rebellion is in a sense also internal. Life itself can push to cruelty, 
to domination, to exclusion, and indeed does so in its moments of 
most exuberant affirmation. 
So this move remains within the modern affirmation of life in 
a sense. There is nothing higher than the movement of life itself 
(the Will to Power). But it chafes at the benevolence, the 
universalism, the harmony, the order. It wants to rehabilitate 
destruction and chaos, the infliction of suffering and exploitation, 
as part of the life to be affirmed. Life properly understood also 
affirms death and destruction. To pretend otherwise is to try to 
restrict it, tame it, hem it in, deprive it of its highest manifestatipns, 
what makes it something you can say "yes" to. 
A religion of life which would proscribe death-dealing, the 
infliction of suffering, is confining and demeaning. Nietzsche 
thinks of himself as having taken up some of the legacy of pre-
Platonic and pre-Christian warrior ethics, their exaltation of 
courage, greatness, elite excellence. Modern life-affirming human-
ism breeds pusillanimity. This accusation frequently recurs in the 
culture of counter-Enlightenment. 
Of course, one of the fruits of this counter-culture was Fascism 
- to which Nietzsche's influence was not entirely foreign, 
however true and valid is Walter Kaufman's refutation of the 
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simple myth of Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi. But in spite of this, the 
fascination with death and violence recurs, e.g., in the' interest in 
Bataille, shared by Derrida and Foucault. James Miller's book on 
Foucault shows the depths of this rebellion against ''humanism," 
as a stifling, confining space one hast~ break out of.S .. 
My·point here is not to score off neo-~ietzscheanism, as some 
kind of antechamber to Fascism. A secular humanist might want 
to do this. But my perspective is rather different. I se~ these 
connections as another manifestation of our (human) inability to 
be content simply with ·an affirmation of life. 
The Nietzschean understanding of enhanced life, which cari 
fully affirm itself, also in a sense takes us beyond life; and in this 
it is analogous with other, religious notions of enhanced life (like 
the NT's "eternal life"). But it takes us beyond by incorporating a 
fascination with the negation of life, with death and suffering. It 
doesn't acknowledge some supreme good beyond life, and in that 
sense sees itself rightly as utterly antithetical to religion. 
-1 am tempted to speculate further, and to suggest that the 
perennial human susceptibility to be fascinated by death and 
violence, is at base a manifestation of our nature as homo 
religiosus. From the point of view of someone who acknowledges 
transcendence, it is one of the places this aspiration beyond most 
easily goes when it fails to take us there. This doesn't mean that 
religion and violence are simply alternatives. On the contrary, it 
has meant that most historical religion has been deeply ini:ricated 
with violence, from human sacrifice down to inter-communal 
massacres. Because most historical religion remains only very 
imperfectly oriented to the beyond. The religious affinities of the 
cult of violence in its different forms are indeed palpable. 
5James Miller, Tbe Passion of Michel Foucault, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1993. 
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What it might mean, however, is that the only way fully to 
escape the draw towards violence lies somewhere in the turn to 
transcendence, that is, through the full-hearted love of some 
good beyond life. A thesis of this kind has been put forward by 
Rene Girard, for whose work I have a great deal of sympathy, 
although I don't agree on the centrality he gives to the scapegoat 
plienomenon. 6 
On the perspective I'm developing here, no position can be set 
aside as simply devoid of insight. We could think of modern 
culture as the scene of a three~cornered- perhaps ultimately, a 
four-cornered - battle. There are secular humanists, there are 
neo-Nietzscheans, and there are those who acknowledge some 
good beyond life. Any pair can gang up against the third on some 
important issue. Neo-Nietzscheans and secular humanists together 
condemn religion and reject any good beyond life. But neo-
Nietzscheans and acknowledgers of transcendence are together in 
their absence of surprise at the continued disappointments of 
secular humanism, together also in the sense that its vision of life 
lacks a dimension. In a third line-up, secular humanists and 
believers come together in defending an idea of the human good, 
against the anti-humanism of Nietzsche's heirs. 
A fourth party can be introduced to this field if we take account 
of the fact that the acknowledgers of transcendence are divided. 
Some think that the whole move to secular humanism was just a 
mistake, which needs to be undone. We need to return to an earlier 
view of things. Others, in which I place myself, think that the 
practical primacy of life has been a great gain for human kind, and 
that there is some truth in the "revolutionary" story: this gain was 
in fact unlikely to come about without some breach with estab-
6See Rene Girard, La Violence et le Sacre; Paris: Grasset, 1972; and Le 
Bouc Emissaire, Paris: Grasset, 1982 
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lished religion. (We might even be tempted to say that modern 
unbelief is providential, but that might be too provocative a way 
of putting it.) But we nevertheless think that the metaphysical 
primacy of life is wrong, and stifling, and that its continued 
dominance puts in danger the practical primacy. 
I have rather complicated the scene in the last paragraphs. 
Nevertheless, the simple lines sketched earlier still stand out, I 
believe. Both secular humanists and anti-humanists concur in the 
"revolutionary" story; that is, they see us as having been liberated 
from the illusion of a good beyond life, and thus enabled to affirm 
ourselves. This may take the form of an Enlightenment endorse-
ment of benevolence and justice; or it may be the charter for the 
full affirmation of the will to power - or "the free play of the 
signifier," or the aesthetics of the self, or whatever the current 
version is. But it remains within the same post-revolutionary 
climate. For those fully within this climate, transcendence be-
comes all but invisible. 
IV 
The above picture of modern culture, seen from one perspec-
tive, suggests a way in which the denial of transcendence can put 
the most valuable gains of modernity in danger, here the primacy 
of rights and the affirmation of life. This is, I repeat, one 
perspective among others; the issue is whether it makes more 
sense of what has been happening over the last two centuries than 
that of an exclusive, secular humanism. It seems very much to me 
that it does so. 
I want now to take up this danger from another angle. I spoke 
above about an immanent revolt against the affirmation of life. 
Nietzsche has become an important figure in the articulation of 
this, a counter-belief to the modern philanthropy which strives to 
increase life and relieve suffering. But Nietzsche also articulated 
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something equally disquieting: an acid account of the sources of 
this modern philanthropy,. of the mainsprings of this compassion 
and sympathy which powers the impressive enterprises of 
modern solidarity. 
Nietzsche's "genealogy" of modern universalism, of the con-
cern for the relief of suffering, of "pity," will probably not convince 
anyone who has the highest examples of Christian agape, or 
Buddhist karuna, before their eyes. But the question remains very 
much open, whether this unflattering portrait doesn't capture the 
possible fate of a culture which has aimed higher than its moral 
sources can sustain it. 
This is the issue I raised very qriefly in the last chapter of 
Sources. The more impressed one is with this colossal extension 
of a Gospel ethic to a universal solidarity, to a concern for human 
beings on the other side of the globe, whom we shall never meet 
or need as companions or compatriots; or, because that is not the 
ultimately difficult challenge, the more impressed we are at the 
sense of justice we can still feel for people we do have contact with, 
and tend to dislike or despise; or at a willingness to help people 
who often seem to be the cause of their own suffering; the more 
we contemplate all this, the more surprise we can feel at people 
generating the motivation to engage in these enterprises of 
solidarity, of international philanthropy, or the modern welfare, 
state. Or to bring out the negative side, the less surprised one is 
when the motivation to keep them going flags, as we see in the 
present hardening of feeling against the impoverished and 
disfavoured in many Western democracies. 
We could put the matter this way. Our age makes higher 
demands of solidarity and benevolence on people today than ever 
before. Never before have people been asked to stretch out so far, 
and so consistently, so systematically, so as a matter of course, to 
the stranger outside the gates. A similar point can be made, if we 
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look at the other dimension of the affirmation of ordinary life, that 
concerned with universal justice.' Here too, we are asked to 
maintain standards of equality which cover wider and wider 
classes of people, bridge more and more kinds of difference, 
impinge more and more in our lives. H~w do we manage to do it? 
, 
Or perhaps we don't manage all that well; and the interesting 
and important question might run: how could we manage to do 
it? But at least to get close to the answer to this, we should ask: 
how do we do as well as we do, which after all, at first sight seems 
in these domains of solidarity and justice much better than 
previous ages? 
1. Well, one way is that performance to these standards has 
become part of what we understand as a decent, civilized human 
life. We live up to them to the extent we do, because we would 
be somewhat ashamed of ourselves if we didn't. They have 
become part of our self-image, our sense of our own worth. And 
alongside this, we feel a sense of satisfaction and superiority when 
we contemplate others- our ancestors, or contemporary illiberal 
societies - who dian't or don't recognize them. 
But we sense immediately how fragile this is as a motivation. 
It makes our philanthropy vulnerable to the shifting fashion of 
media attention, and the various modes of feel-good hype. We 
throw ourselves into the cause of the month, raise funds for this 
famine, petition the government to intervene in that grisly civil 
war; and then forget all about it next month, when it drops off the 
CNN screen. A solidarity ultimately driven by the giver's own sense 
of moral superiority is a whimsical and fickle thing. We are far in 
fact from the universality and unconditionality which our moral 
outlook prescribes. 
We might envisage getting beyond this by a more exigent sense 
of our own moral wo'rth; one that would require more consistency, 
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a certain independence from fashion, careful, informed attention 
to the real needs. This is part of what people working in NGOs in 
the field must feel, who correspondingly look down on us TV-
image-driven givers, as we do on the lesser breeds who don't 
respond to this type of campaign at all. 
2. But the most exigent, lofty sense of self-worth has limita-
tions. I feel worthy in helping people, in giving without stint. But 
~hat is worthy about helping people? It's obvious, as humans they 
have a certain dignity. My feelings of self-worth connect intellec-
tually and emotionally with my sense of the worth of human 
beings. Here is where modern secuiar humanism is tempted to 
congratulate itself. In replacing the low and demeaning picture of 
human beings as depraved, inveterate sinners, in articulating the 
potential of human beings for goodness and greatness, humanism 
has not only given us the courage to act for reform, but also 
explains why this philanthropic action is so immensely worth-
while. The higher the human potential, the greater the enterprise 
of realizing it, the more the carriers of this potential are worthy of 
our help in achieving it. 
But philanthropy and solidarity driven by a lofty humanism, 
just as that which was driven often by high religious ideals, has a 
Janus face. On one side, in the abstract, one is inspired to act. But 
on the other, faced with the immense disappointments of actual 
human performance, with the myriad ways in which real, concrete. 
human beings fall short of, ignore, parody and betray this 
I 
magnificent potential, one cannot but experience a growing sense 
of anger and futility. Are these people really worthy objects of all 
these efforts? Perhaps in face of all this stupid recalcitrance, it 
would not be a betrayal of human worth, or one's self-worth, if one 
abandoned them. Or perhaps the best that can be done for them 
is to force them to shape up. 
Before the reality of human shortcomings, philanthropy- the 
love of the human - can gradually come to be invested with 
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contempt, hatred, aggression. The action is broken off, or worse, 
continues, but invested now with these new feelings, and becomes 
progressively more coercive and inhumane. The.history of des-
potic socialism, i.e., twentieth century communism, is replete with 
this tragic turn, brilliantly forseen by Dq~toyevsky over 100 years 
ago ("Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrived at un!imited , 
despotism"7), and then repeated again and again with a fatal 
regularity, through one-party regimes on a macro level, to a host 
of "helping" institutions on a micro level from orphanages to 
boarding schools for aboriginals. 
The ultimate stop on the line was reached by Elena Ceaucescu 
in her last recorded statement before her murder by the successor 
regime: that the Rumanian people have shown themselves unwor-
thy of the immense untiring efforts of her husband on their behalf. 
The tragic irony is that the higher the sense of potential, the 
more grievously real people fall short, and the more severe the 
turn-around will be which is inspired by the disappointment. A 
lofty humanism posits high standards of self-worth, and a magnifi-
cent goal to strive towards. It inspires enterprises of great moment. 
But by this very token it encourages force, despotism, tutelage, 
ultimately contempt, and a certain ruthlessness is shaping refrac-
tory human material. Oddly enough, the same horrors which 
Enlightenment critique picked up in societies and institutions 
dominated by religion. 
And for the same causes. The difference of belief here is not 
crucial. Wherever action for high ideals is not tempered, con-
trolled, uitimately engulfed in an unconditional love of the 
beneficiaries, this ugly dialectic risks repeating !tself. And of 
course, just holding the appropriate religious beliefs is no guaran-
tee that this will be so. · 
7Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Devils, Trans. David Magarshack, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971, p. 404. 
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3. A third pattern of motivation, which we have seen repeat-
edly, this time in the register of justice rather than benevolence: We 
have seen it with Jacobins, Bolsheviks, and today with the 
politically correct left, as well as the so-called "Christian" right. We 
fight against injustices which cry out to heaven for vengeance. We 
are moved by a flaming indignation against these: racism, oppres-
sion, sexism, or leftist attacks on the family or Christian faith. This 
indignation comes to be fuelled by hatred for those who support 
and connive with these injustices; and this in turn is fed by our 
sense of superiority that we are not like these instruments and 
accomplices of evil. Soon we are blinded to the havoc we wreak 
around us. Our picture of the world has safely located all evil 
outside of us. The very energy and hatred with which we combat 
evil proves its exteriority to us. We must never relent, but on the 
contrary double our energy, vie with each other in indignation 
and denunciation. 
Another tragic irony nests here. The stronger the sense of (often 
correctly identified) injustice, the more powerfully this pattern can 
become entrenched. We become centres of hatred, generators of 
new modes of injustice on a greater scale, but we started with the 
most exquisite sense of wrong, the greatest passion for justice and 
equality and peace. 
A Buddh_ist friend of mine from Thailand briefly visited the 
German Greens. He confessed to utter bewilderment. He thought 
he understood the goals of the party: peace between human 
beings, and a stance of respect and friendship by humans towards 
nature. But what astonished him was all the anger, the tone of 
denunciation, of hatred towards the established parties. These 
people didn't seem to see that the first step towards their goal 
would have to involve stilling the anger and aggression in 
themselves. He couldn't understand what they were up to. 
The blindness is typical of modern exclusive secular human-
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ism. This modern humanism prides itself on having released 
energy for philanthropy and reform; by getting rid of"original sin," 
of a lowly and demeaning picture of human nature, it encourages 
us to reach high. Of course, there is some truth in this. But it is also, 
terribly partial, terribly naive, because it has never faced the 
questions I have been raising here: what can power this gr~at effort 
at philanthropic reform? This humanism leaves us with our own 
high sense of self-worth to keep us from backsliding, a high notion 
of human worth to inspire us forward, and a flaming indignation 
against wrong and oppression to energize us. It cannot appreciate 
how problematic all of these are, how easily they can slide into 
something trivial, ugly or downright dangerous and destructive. 
A Nietzschean genealogist can have a field day here. Nothing 
gave Nietzsche greater satisfaction than showing how morality or 
spirituality is really powered by its direct opposite; e.g., that the 
Christian aspiration to love is really motivated by the hatred of the 
weak for the strong. Whatever one thinks of this judgement on 
Christianity, it is clear that modern humanism is full of potential for 
such disconcerting reversals: from dedication to others to self-
indulgent, feel-good responses, from a lofty sense of human 
dignity to control powered by contempt and hatred, from absolute 
freedom to absolute despotism, from a flaming desire to help the 
oppressed to an incandescent hatred for all those who stand in the 
way. And the higher,the flight, the greater the potential fall. 
Perhaps after all, it's safer to have small goals, not too great 
expectations, be somewhat cynical about human potentiality from 
the start. This is undoubtedly so, but then one also risks not having 
the motivation to undertake great acts of solidarity, and combat 
great injustices. In the end, the question becomes a maximum one: 
how to have the greatest degree of philanthropic action with the 
minimum hope in mankind. A figure like Or. Rieu in Camus' La 
Peste stands as a possible solution to this problem. But that is 
fiction. What is possible in real life? 
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I said earlier that just having appropriate beliefs is no solution 
to these dile"mmas. And the transformation of high ideals into 
brutal practice was demonstrated lavishly in Christendom well 
before modern humanism came on the scene. So is there a 
way out? 
This cannot be a matter of guarantee, only of faith. But it is clear 
that Christian spirituality points to one. It can be described in two 
ways. Either as a love/compassion which is unconditional, that is, 
not based on what you the recipient have made of yourself; or as 
one based on what you are most profoundly, a being in the image 
of God. They obviously amount to the same thing. In either case, 
the love is not conditional on the worth realized in you just as an 
individual, or even in what is realizable in you alone. That's 
because being made in the image of God, as a feature of each 
human being, is not something that can be characterized just by 
reference to this being alone. Our being in the image of God is also 
our standing among others in the stream of love which is that facet 
of God's life we try to grasp, very inadequately, in speaking of 
the Trinity. 
Now it makes a whole lot of difference whether you think this 
kind of love is a possibility for us humans. I think it is, but only to 
the extent that we open ourselves to God, which means in fact, 
overstepping the limits set in theory by exclusive humanisms. If 
one does believe that, then one has something very important to 
say to modern times, something that addresses the fragility of what 
all of us, believer and unbeliever alike, most value in these times. 
Can we try to take stock of the first leg of our strange Ricci-like 
journey into the present? The trip is obviously not complete. We 
have just looked at some facets of modernity: the espousal of 
universal and unconditional rights, the affirmation of life, universal 
justice and benevolence. Important as these are, there are plainly 
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others: for instance, freedom; and also the ethic of authenticity,8 
to mention just two. Nor have I had time to examine other.dark 
features of modernity, such as ·its drive towards instrumental 
reason and control. But I think an examination of these other facets 
would show a similar pattern. So I'd like to try to define this 
more closely. 
In a sense our journey was a flop. Imitating Ricci would involve 
taking a distance from our time, feeling as strange in it as he was 
arriving in China. But what we saw as children of Christendom was 
first, something terribly familiar - certain intimations of the 
Gospel, carried to unprecedented lenghts; and secondly, a flat 
negation of our faith - exclusive humanism. But still, like Ricci, 
we were bewildered by this. We had to struggle to make a 
discernment, as he did. He wanted to distinguish between those 
things in the new culture which came from the natural knowledge 
we all have of God, and should be affirmed and extended, on one 
hand; and those practices which were distortions and would have 
to be changed on the other. And similarly, we are challenged to 
a difficult discernment, trying to see what in modern culture 
reflects its furthering of the Gospel, and what its refusal of 
the transcendent. 
The point of my Ricci image is that this is not easy. And the best 
way to try to achieve it is to take at least some relative distance, 
in history if not in geography. The danger is that we not be 
sufficiently bewildered, that we think we have it all figured out 
from the start, and we know what to affirm and .what to deny. We 
then can enter smoothly into the mainstream of a debate which is 
already going on in our society, about the nature and value of 
SWhich I have discussed in Tbe Malaise of Modernity, Toronto: Anansi 
1991; American edition: Tbe Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard University 
Press, 1992. 
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modernity. As I have indicated,9 this debate tends to become 
polarized between "boosters" and "knockers," who either con-
demn or affirm modernity en bloc, thus missing what is really at 
stake here, which is how to rescue admirable ideals from sliding 
into demeaning modes of realization. 
From the Christian point of view, the corresponding error is to 
fall into one. of two untenable positions: either we piCk certain 
fruits of moden1ity, like human rights, and take them on board, but 
then condemn the whole movement of thought and pr~ctice 
which underly them, in particular the break-out from Christendom 
(in earlier variants, even the fruits were condemned); or in reaction 
to. this first position, we feel we have to go all the way with 
the "boosters" of modernity, and become fellow travellers of 
exclusive humanism. 
Better, I would argue, after an initial (and let's face it, still 
continuing) bewilderment, gradually to find our voice from within 
the achievements of modernity; to measure the humbling degree 
to which some of the most impressive extensions of a Gospel ethic 
depended on a breakaway from Christendom; and from within 
these gains try to make clear to ourselves and others the tremen-
dous dangers that arise in them. It is perhaps not an accident that 
the history of the twentieth century can be read either in a 
perspective of progress, or in one of mounting horror. Perhaps it 
is not contingent that it is the century both of Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima, and of Amnesty International and Medecins sans 
Frontieres. As with Ricci, the Gospel message to this time and 
society has to respond both to what in it already reflects the life 
of God, and to the doors which have been closed against this life. 
And in the end, it is no easier for us than it was for Ricci to discern 
both correctly, even if for opposite reasons. Between us twentieth-
century Catholics, we have our own variants of the Chinese Rites 
controversy. Let us pray that we do better this time. 
9See op. cit. 
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THE MARIANIST AWARD 
Each year the University of Dayton presents the Marianist Award 
to a Roman Catholic distinguished for achievement in scholarship 
and the intellectual life. 
Established in 1950, the award was originally presented to 
individuals who made outstanding contributions to Mariology: In 
1967, the concept for the award was broadened to honor those 
people who had made outstanding contributions to humanity. The 
award, as currently given, was reactivated in 1986. 
The Marianist Award is named for the founding religious order 
of the University of Dayton, the Society of Mary (Marianists). The 










THE MARIANIST AWARD 
1950 Juniper Carol, O.F.M. 
1951 Daniel A. Lord, S.J. 
1952 Patrick Peyton, C.S.C. 
1953 Roger Brien 
1954 Emil Neubert, S.M. 
1955 Joseph A. Skelly, C.M. 
1956 Frank Duff 
1957 John McShain 
Eugene F. Kennedy, Jr. 
1958 Winifred A. Feely 
1959 Bishop John F. Noll 
<~l<J~ Eamon R. Carroll, 0. Carm. 
1961 Coley Taylor'< ~ 
1963 Rene Laurentin -
1964 Philip C. Hoelle, S.M. 
1965 Cyril 0. Vollert, S.J. 
1967 Eduardo Frei-Montalva 
1986 John Tracy Ellis 
1987 Rosemary Haughton 
1988 Timothy O'Meara 
1989 Walter]. Ong, S.J. 
1990 Sidney Callahan 
1991 John T. Noonan, Jr. 
1992 L<?uis Dupre 
·1993 Monika ·Hellwig 
1994 Philip Gleason 
1995 J. Bryan Hehir· 




Reques~s for additional copies 
of this or previous lectures may be made to 
the Office of the President, 
University of Dayton 
Dayton, Ohio 45469-1624 
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